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1900.

EXPLANATION.
In the following pages the article or articles of the

Naval War Code npon which questions are raised or
upon which discussions are based will in each case precede the questions and discussions. The code as a whole
will be found at the end of the discussions, on pages
101-11-4.
On the pages following the code will be found
the Instructions for the government of armies of the
United States in the field, pages 115-139; Convention
between the United States of America and certain
powers with respect to the laws and customs of war on
land (Hague Convention, proclaimed by the United
States April 11, 1903), pages 141-158; Convention for
the adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of
the Geneva Convention of August 22, 1804 (proclaimed
by the United States November 1, 1901), pages 159-167.

DISCUSSIONS.
Section

I.

Hostilities.

Article

1.

The general object of war is to procure the complete
submission of the enemy at the earliest possible period,
with the least expenditure of life and property.
The special objects of maritime war are: The capture
or destruction of the military and naval forces of the
enemy; of his fortifications, arsenals, dry docks, and
dockyards; of his various military and naval establishments, and of his maritime commerce: to prevent his
(13)
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procuring war material from neutral sources; to aid
and assist military operations on land, and to protect
and defend the national territory, property, and seaborne commerce.

Would

be advisable to insert in Article 1 after
line 3 as the clause beginning line 4 the words,
The
general object of maritime war is to deprive the enemy
of the use of the sea?"
(a)

it

'

'

The question

words

in regard to the insertion of the

"The general object of maritime war is to deprive the
enemy of the use of the sea" is raised in consequence of
the position taken by certain French writers. Logically,
there might be a statement of (l) the general object of
all war, (2) the general object of the phase of war of
which the code treats, (3) the special object of maritime war. Granting this arrangement, would the clause
cover the objects of maritime war at the present time?

Would

cover those measures which might be taken to
inflict injury upon land defenses, etc.
or the measures
to cooperate with the army in various ways ?
it

;

In the

first

half of the nineteenth century the object

maritime war was for the most part to deprive the
enemy of the use of the sea, but with the increase in the
use of steam, the lengthening range of guns, etc. there
has come an enlargement of the field of maritime control and of the range of objects at which it aims.
of

,

The general

object of maritime

war

is

from the general object of war as a whole.

not different

The

field of

"The capoperations is somewhat restricted, however.
ture or destruction of the military and naval forces of the
enemy; of his fortifications, arsenals, dry docks, and
dockyards of his various military and naval establish,

;

ments, and of his maritime commerce; to prevent his
procuring war material from neutral sources to aid and
assist military operations on land, and to protect and
defend the national territory, property, and sea-borne
commerce," are stated as the objects of maritime war.
Yet some of these acts are no more the objects of maritime war in themselves than the killing of individuals
in uniform is the object of land warfare. These measures
;
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are such, as are allowed with view to attaining the submission of the enemy. The destruction of a fortification

commerce is not in itself the object of war, but
merely a means to attain the object, and by the first section of this article should be reduced to the minimum,
i. e., there should be "the least expenditure of life and
or of

property."

important to distinguish the object from the
means of attaining the object. There is a
growing tendency to penalize the nation which mistakes
the means for the end. Certain measures may be used
It is

justifiable

as contributory to the general object of war.
it

will be difficult at times to determine

Of

course \

what is contribu-

but action that is distinctly not contributory even
though enumerated among the special objects, may not
be justifiable, and may be censured. Censure might
tory,

arise in consequence of the destruction of

such a structure as a privately owned shipyard, provided such
destruction was not reasonably necessary to the ends of
the military or naval undertaking, though it might,
under conceivable circumstances, be of service to the
enemy.

The

part of Article 1 might well read: "The
general object of war is to procure the complete submission of the enemy at the earliest possible period with
the least expenditure of life and property."
In maritime operations the usual measures for attai ing this object are The capture or destruction of the
military and naval forces of the enemy, etc."
(b) Would a dry dock within hostile territory, owned
and managed by a private company and sufficiently
large to receive a ship of war, be liable to the same
treatment as would fortifications and arsenals ?
The destruction of a dry dock owned and managed by
a private company would, from the context, not be
included in the same class as fortifications and arsenals,
which are distinctly classed as belonging to the enemy,
first

1

'

1

1

:

"of his fortifications, etc."
While a public dry dock would be liable to capture or
destruction, a private dry dock does not fall into this

i.

e.,
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becomes such as to afford aid to the
enemy. It may be in itself a commercial undertaking
of value in peace and not specially designed for war, as
would be the case of an arsenal or fortification.
The capture of the privately owned dry dock would
of course be entirely justifiable at any time as a measure
of war.
The destruction is not justifiable under the
same provision as that in regard to arsenals and fortifications, which are public and by nature adapted for
war but being private, if destruction be permissible at
all, it must be based on Article 3, which, following the
majority of authorities, would allow such an act if
justified by a reasonable military necessity.
Article
XXIII (g) of The Hague Convention, with respect to
the laws and customs of war on land, prohibits the
destruction or seizure of " enemy's property unless such
category until

it

;

destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the
necessities of war." Taylor, in his recent book, International Public Law, page 547, says: " Private property

according to existing rules is treated even more favorably than that of the public. Except in extreme cases,
to be mentioned hereafter, it is both respected and protected.
At The Hague it was declared that family
honor and rights, individual lives and private property,
as well as religious liberty and worship, must be respected. Private property can not be confiscated. "
'All
private property, even that of the individual sovereign,
l

is

now

respected, at least in theory,

and booty therein

not permitted. As Zacharia expresses it, private property of the enemy can be touched only so far as the
necessities of war require, for it is part of the war power
of its country only so far as that country could itself
exercise dominion over it."
Of course a commanding officer must himself judge as
To destroy the
to whether a military necessity exists.
privately owned dry dock, except from military necessity, would constitute "wanton devastation" forbidden
by Article 3 of the Naval War Code.
(c) How would a pleasure yacht be treated under the

is

provisions of Article

1 ?

2
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This question

"merchant

is

raised because Article 25 specifies

seeming
The interpretation that has
to create a distinct class.
been given to the word "commerce" under the Constitution would probably be sufficiently wide to include
pleasure yachts, but not if they are placed in a class by
themselves. Hence, under Article 1, as interpreted with
view to Article 25 and some of the earlier articles in
Section IV as, e. g., Article 14, a pleasure yacht would
not be included.
vessels, yachts, or neutral vessels,"

would therefore have to be captured if
Article 3, which would be very difficult of
It

at all

under

application,

because the proof of military necessity in the capture of
a pleasure yacht would not be easy and often would be
impossible.
Hence, some provision should be made
elsewhere in the code for such capture which may be as
desirable as the capture of a merchant vessel. This will
be introduced later.

One further measure for attaining the objects of
war which is becoming of more and more importance is
the cutting off of the means of communication between
the enemy and the outside world. It is therefore decided that the words "and communications" be added
after the words maritime commerce. " To avoid possible
(d)

'

'

would further be advisable to insert instead of the words "to aid and assist" the words "to cooperate with the Army in" so that the clause would read

confusion,

it

"to cooperate with the

Army

in military operations on

land."
Article

1

as revised

would therefore read:

The general object of war is to procure the complete submission
enemy at the earliest possible period, with the least expenditure of life and property.

of the

In maritime operations the usual measures for attaining this object
To capture or destroy the military and naval forces of the
enemy; his fortifications, arsenals, dry docks, and dockyards; his
various military and naval establishments, and his maritime commerce and communications; to prevent his procuring war material
from neutral sources; to cooperate with the Army in military
operations on land, and to protect and defend the national territory,
property, and sea-borne commerce.
are:

—

—

20681

—

—

:

is

The above form, was agreed upon as covering essential
amendments provided Article 1 be retained in the code.
was, however, the general opinion
1. That the article served no essential purpose because
the general object of war is well known and needs no
definition and the measures of maritime warfare vary
with circumstances.
2. That it might tend to restrict an officer in the exercise of Lis functions rather than make these more
clear to him.
majority of the officers in attendance upon the conference were of the opinion that Article 1 should be
stricken out entirely.
It

A

Article

The area

2.

maritime warfare comprises the high seas
or other waters that are under no jurisdiction, and the
territorial waters of belligerents.
Neither hostilities
nor any belligerent right, such as that of visitation and
search, shall be exercised in the territorial waters of
of

neutral States.

The territorial waters of a State extend seaward to the
distance of a marine league from the low-water mark of
its coast line.
They also include, to a reasonable extent,
which is in many cases determined by usage, adjacent
parts of the sea, such as bays, gulfs, and estuaries inclosed within headlands; and where the territory by
which they are inclosed belongs to two or more States,
the marine limits of such States are usually defined by
conventional lines.

How should such a body of water as Long Island Sound
be regarded under the provisions of Article 2 ?
This situation does not from the point of view of the
United States admit of discussion. It is the established
rule that such waters as Long Island Sound are territorial waters of the United States.
The jurisdiction
over gulfs and bays having a mouth considerably over
Hall
6 miles wide is still open to difference of opinion.
briefly

summarizes the current opinion as follows

In any case the custom of regarding a line three miles from land as
defining the boundary of marginal territorial waters

that a state must be supposed to accept
notice that a larger extent is claimed.

it

is

so far fixed

in the absence of express
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The question of the principle upon which the extent of marginal
waters should be founded and of the breadth of water that should be
included, has of late attracted a considerable amount of attention.
It is felt, and growingly felt, not only that the width of three miles is
insufficient for the safety of the territory, but that it is desirable for a
state to have control over a larger space of water for the purpose of
regulating and preserving the fishery in it, the productiveness of sea
fisheries being seriously threatened by the destructive methods of
fishing which are commonly employed, and in many places by the
greatly increased number of fishing vessels frequenting the grounds.
After being carefully studied and reported upon by a Committee
of the Institut de Droit International, the subject was exhaustively
discussed by the Institut at its meeting in Paris, in 1894, the exceptionally large number of thirty-nine members being present. With regard
to the necessity of ascribing a greater breadth than three miles of territorial water to the littoral state there was no difference of opinion.
As to the extent to which the marginal belt should be enlarged, and
the principle upon which enlargement should be based, the same
unanimity was not manifested, but ultimately it was resolved by a
large majority that a zone of six marine miles from low- water mark
ought to be considered territorial for all purposes, and that in time
of war a neutral state should have the right to extend this zone by
declaration of neutrality or by notification, for all purposes of
neutrality, to a distance from the shore corresponding to the extreme
range of cannon. (International Law, 4th ed., p. 160 and note.)
Article

3.

Military necessity permits measures that are indispensable for securing the ends of the war and that are
in accordance with modern laws and usages of war.
It does not permit wanton devastation, the use of
poison, or the doing of any hostile act that would make
the return of peace unnecessarily difficult.
Noncombatants are to be spared in person and property during hostilities, as much as the necessities of war
and the conduct of such noncombatants will permit.

The launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons, or by other new methods of a similar nature, is
prohibited for a term of five years by the Declaration
of The Hague, to which the United States became a
party.
This rule does not apply when at war with a
noncontracting Power.
In Article 3, line 4, should the clause "the use of
poison" be stricken out?
The first clause, "military necessity permits," etc..
provides that only such measures shall be used as are
in accord "with modern laws and usages of war."
(a)
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If there is one measure that is fully understood to be
forbidden by the modern laws and usages of war, it is
"the use of poison." This is forbidden by all codes.

Hague Convention with respect to the laws and
customs of war on land, Art. 23.) There is no more
(See

reason for insertion of "the use of poison " than of many
other clauses; indeed less, because the use of poison is
more generally forbidden than almost any other act.
The clause should therefore be stricken out unless other
specifications are to be introduced.'
(b) In the same place, should the following be inserted?
"The destruction of great public works primarily and mainly intended to promote commerce."
There has been much discussion upon the advisability
of forbidding the destruction of "great public works
primarily and mainly intended to promote commerce."
The Suez Canal already has a quasi neutralization.
By the Convention of 1888 it was agreed that a system
should be established to "guarantee at all times, and
for all the powers, the free use of the Suez maritime
canal." The articles showing the nature of this agreement as touching Article 3 of the Naval War Code are
as follows

•

ARTICLE

of

I.

The Suez maritime canal shall always be free and open, in time
war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war,

without distinction of flag.
Consequently, the high contracting parties agree not in any way
to interfere with the free use of the canal, in time of war as in time
of peace.

The canal

shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of

blockade.

ARTICLE

IV.

The maritime canal remaining open in time of war as a free paswar of belligerents, according to the terms

sage, even to the ships of

of Article

1

of the present treaty, the high contracting parties agree

war shall be exercised, nor shall any act of hostility,
any act having for its object to obstruct the free navigation of
the canal, be committed in the canal and its ports of access, nor
within a radius of 3 marine miles from those ports, even though the
Ottoman Empire should be one of the belligerent powers.
that no right of
or

Vessels of
in the canal

war
and

of belligerents shall not revictual or take in stores
its

ports of access, except in so far as

may be strictly

.
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The

through the canal
with the least possible delay, in accordance with
the regulations in force, and without any other intermission than

necessary.

transit of the aforesaid vessels

shall be effected

that resulting from the necessities of the service.
Their stay at Port Said and in the roadstead of Suez shall not ex-

ceed twenty-four hours, except in case of distress. In such case they
shall be bound to leave as soon as possible.
An interval of twentyfour hours shall always elapse between the sailing of a belligerent
ship from one of the ports of access and the departure of a ship
belonging to the hostile power.

ARTICLE

V.

In time of war belligerent powers shall not disembark nor embark
within the canal and its ports of access either troops, munitions,
or materials of war. But in case of an accidental hindrance in the
canal, men may be embarked or disembarked at the ports of access
by detachments not exceeding 1,000 men, with a corresponding

amount

of

war

material.

ARTICLE
Prizes shall be subject, in
vessels of

war

VI.

all respects, to

the same rules as the

of belligerents.

ARTICLE

VII.

keep any vessel of war in the waters of the
canal (including Lake Timsah and the Bitter Lakes)
Nevertheless, they may station vessels of war in the ports of access of Port Said and Suez, the number of which shall not exceed
two for each power.
This right shall not be exercised by belligerents. (Holland. Studies

The powers

shall not

in International

Law,

p. 289.)

proposed to give to the Panama or any similar
great commercial undertaking exemption because an
easily inflicted injury might destroy the work of years
without giving to the belligerent any corresponding
military advantage, e. g., the breaking of a dam which
might flood or destroy much of the work on the Panama
It is

Canal.
If the United States constructs the canal without any
provision for neutralization other than that in the Ha\ -

Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, which is binding on Great
Britain and the United States, some provision in regard
to great public works might be desirable, provided other
nations agree to the same rule. The advisability of an
international agreement in regard to such great public

:

:
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works is admitted, but it would not be advisable for the
United States to forbid its officers action which other
states do not deny to their officers.
Therefore the provisions of this clause as it stands,
omitting "the use of poison," because that is covered
by general rules, should stand.
the clause beginning
(c) Under the provisions of
" Noncombatants are to be spared," etc., should an unarmed dispatch boat be treated in any respects differently from an armored enemy's vessel; if so, in what
respect

The

?

vessel

is

liable to treatment as a vessel

in the service of the
this case falls

enemy.

under the

engaged

In respect to the vessel,

paragraph of Article 13,
the personnel, under Article 10 of the
first

and in respect to
code, which are as follows

Art. 13. All public vessels of the enemy are subject to capture,
except those engaged in purely charitable or scientific pursuits, in
voyages of discovery, or as hospital ships under the regulations
hereinafter mentioned.
Art. 10. The personnel of all public unarmed vessels of the
enemy, either owned or in his service as auxiliaries, are liable, upon
capture, to detention as prisoners of war.

In the application of The Hague rule in regard
to the launching of projectiles and explosives, what
would be the effect if an enemy contracting party
should make an offensive and defensive alliance with
a noncontracting party ?
This rule would cease to be binding. This portion of
the code should read
(//)

By

the Declaration of The Hague, signed July 29, 1899, to which
is a party, it is provided that:

the United States

The contracting powers agree
years, the launching of projectiles

to prohibit, for a term of five
and explosives from balloons, or

by other new methods of similar nature.
The present Declaration is only binding on the contracting powers in case of war between two or more of them.
It shall cease to be binding from the time when in a war between
the contracting powers one of the belligerents is joined by a noncontracting power.
(e)

Should this Hague rule be renewed at the expira-

tion of the five-year period

?

:

:
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The reasons for the limitation of the period to five
years are shown in the report of The Hague Conference,
made by the late Mr. Holls
On the subject of balloons, the subcommittee first voted a perpetual prohibition of their use, or that of similar new machines, for
throwing projectiles or explosives. In the full committee, on motion of Captain Crozier, the prohibition was unanimously limited
to cover a period of five years only. The action taken was for
humanitarian reasons alone, and was founded upon the opinion that
balloons, as they now exist, form so uncertain a means of injury
that they can not be used with accuracy. The persons or objects
injured by throwing explosives may be entirely disconnected from
the conflict, and such that their injury or destruction would be of
no practical advantage to the party making use of the machines.

The

limitation of the prohibition to five years' duration preserves

under such changed circumstances as may be produced by the progress of invention. (The Peace Conference at The
Hague, p. 95.)

liberty of action

The reasons that applied at the time of the Peace
Conference are eqnally valid at the present time therefore the article, as cited nnder (d) above, from present
indications, shonld be renewed.
;

Article

Jf.

The bombardment, by a naval force, of unfortified and
undefended towns, villages, or buildings is forbidden,
except when such bombardment is incidental to the
destruction of military or naval establishments, public
depots of munitions of war, or vessels of war in port,
or unless reasonable requisitions for provisions and supplies essential, at the time, to such naval vessel or vessels
are forcibly withheld, in which case due notice of bombardment shall be given.
The bombardment of unfortified and undefended
towns and places for the nonpayment of ransom is
forbidden.
(a) Would it not be more strictly correct and in
accord with the best opinion so to amend Article 4 as
to read

The bombardment by a naval force of unfortified and undefended
towns, villages, or buildings is forbidden, though such towns, villages, or buildings are liable to the damages incidental to the
destruction of military or naval establishments, public depots of
munitions of war, or vessels of war in port, and such towns.

:

villages, or buildings are liable to direct

bombardment when

rea-

sonable requisitions for provisions and supplies at the time essential
to the naval force are withheld, in which case due notice of bombardment shall be given.

The

Law

by the

Institute of International

at Venice, 189(3, provide:

Art.

war

rules adopted

1.

as to

There

is

no difference between the rules of the law of
military forces on land and that by

bombardment by

naval forces.

The Hague Convention, with respect
customs of war on land, provides
XXV. The

to the

laws and

bombardment of towns, villages, habwhich are not defended is prohibited.
Art. XXVI. The commander of an attacking force, before commencing a bombardment, except in the case of an assault, should
Art.

attack or

itations, or buildings

do all he can to warn the authorities.
Art. XXVII. In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps
should be taken to spare as far as possible edifices devoted to religion,
art, science,

wounded are

and charity, hospitals and places where the sick and
collected, provided they are not used at the same time

for military purposes.

The besieged should

indicate these buildings or places

particular and visible signs,

which should previously be

by some

notified to

the assailants.

The situation is, however, somewhat different in
bombardment by land forces. It is evident, however,
that it was not the intent that these rules of The Hague
Convention should apply to naval warfare, as the conclusions of The Hague Conference contain, in the
seventh resolution, the following statement "The Conference expresses the wish that the proposition of regu:

lating the question of
villages

bombardment

of ports, cities, or

by a naval force should be referred

for exami-

nation to another conference."
As Article 4 of the code now reads, it has been held
that unfortified and. undefended towns may be bombarded directly, when such direct bombardment is a
part of a more general attempt at the destruction of
military or naval establishments, public depots of
munitions of war, etc.
It has been held that such
bombardment might be undertaken upon a given day
with the expectation that at some future time the

25

"military or naval

establishments,"

etc.,

would

be

bombarded.

Such action would not be permissible, however, according to the best opinion of modern times. Bombardment can only be aimed at military or naval establishments," etc., as named in Article 4. The "unfortified
and undefended towns, villages, or buildings" may
without direct intention be injured in the fire incidental
Such injury can not be called
to such bombardment.
bombardment of the "towns, villages, or buildings."
'

'

should be observed that a single act of forcible
resistance to an order of a properly authorized military
A town, village, or
officer may constitute defense.
dwelling may thus easily pass from an undefended to a
defended condition.
It

The requisition for supplies must be reasonable and
must be properly made. The characteristics of such
action are indicated by the Hague Convention with
respect to the laws and customs of war on land.
Art. LII. Neither requisition in kind nor services can be demanded
from communes or inhabitants, except for the necessities of the
army of occupation. They must be in proportion to the resources
of the country, and of such a nature as not to involve the population in the obligation of taking part in military operations against
their country.

These requisitions and services shall only be demanded on the
authority of the commander in the locality occupied.
The contributions in kind shall, as far as possible, be paid for in
ready money; if not, their receipt shall be acknowledged.

To avoid possible misinterpretation, the clause should
read: "The bombardment, by a naval force, of unfortified and undefended towns, villages, or buildings is forbidden, though such towns, villages, or buildings are
liable to the damages incidental to the destruction of
military or naval establishments, public depots of munitions of war, or vessels of war in port, and such towns,
villages, or buildings are liable to bombardment when
reasonable requisitions for provisions and supplies at the
time essential to the naval force are withheld, in which
case due notice of bombardment shall be given."

:
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Should the clause "The bombardment of unfortified and undefended towns and places for the nonpayment of ransom is forbidden," be stricken out?
The clause "The bombardment of unfortified and
undefended towns and places for the nonpayment of
ramsom is forbidden " should be retained as a part of
the code. The matter of such bombardment has been
recently and quite fully discussed before this Naval
War College by Prof. John Bassett Moore and will
be found in the publications of the Naval War College,
International Law Situations with Solutions and Notes,
Latest opinion and practice alike
1901, pages 5-37.
(b)

»

support the retention of this clause of Article

4.

(c) Should a clause to the effect that "An open town
which is defended against the entrance of troops or disembarked marines may be bombarded in order to protect the landing of soldiers and marines if the open
town attempts to prevent it, and as an auxiliary measure
of war, in order to facilitate an assault made by the
troops and the disembarked marines, if the town defends

itself,"

be inserted?

The insertion of such a provision is unnecessary, as
"an open town" which is in the position described is no
longer "an open town" in the sense of an undefended
town, which is the town exempt by Article 4; therefore
the town, by defense against the entrance of troops or

'

disembarked marines, becomes liable to the military
operations which might include bombardment if circumstances made it necessary.
(d) Would bombardment of an open town be justifiable in case a division of the enemy's army occupies
the town and refuses to surrender on demand of the
United States naval force?

The

Institute of International

Law,

in its session in

September, 189G, adopted the following regulation

An

open town

may

not be exposed to bombardment by the sole

fact:

the capital of a state or the seat of government (but,
naturally, these circumstances give it no guarantee against bom1.

That

it is

bardment)

.

:
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2. That it is actually occupied by troops, or that it is ordinarily
garrisoned by troops of various arms, destined to rejoin the army
in time of war.

generally accepted, would not cover the
case under consideration, however, for the occupancy
by the enemy's troops is not the sole fact nor even the
important fact in this case. The important fact is that
an armed force refuses on demand to surrender, and the
fact that it remains in "an open town" in name, can not
exempt the town or force from the necessary military

This rule,

if

measures. The town, in fact, becomes defended under
these circumstances and is liable to treatment as such a
town.
(e) The harbor of an unfortified town is supposed to
contain submarine mines making entry dangerous.
The commanding officer of the United States naval
forces requests assurances in regard to the condition of
the harbor. This is refused. Is the officer justified in
bombarding the town in order to obtain an answer or
as a measure of war?
The refusal to give information or assurances to the
commanding officer leaves him no alternative other
than to assume that the town is defended against approach from the sea. Such being the case, he is justified
in bombarding the town after due notice, either in
order to obtain an answer to his reasonable request for
information or as a measure of war.
Article

5.

The following rules are to be followed with regard to
submarine telegraphic cables in time of war, irrespective
of their ownership
(a) Submarine telegraphic cables between points in
the territory of an enemy, or between the territory of
the United States and that of an enemy, are subject to
such treatment as the necessities of war may require.
(6) Submarine telegraphic cables between the territory of an enemy and neutral territory maybe interrupted within the territorial jurisdiction of the enemy.
(c) Submarine telegraphic cables between two nent ra]
territories shall be held inviolable and free from interruption.
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(a) Should the clause, "or at any point outside of
neutral jurisdiction, if the necessities of war require,"

be added to (b) under Article 5?
After consideration of recent practice and the discussions in regard to the treatment of submarine telegraphic

would seem best to elaborate the first clause
Article 5.
It was evidently not intended to require

cables, it

of

should be followed invariably.
Accordingly the first clause should read as
"
follows
Unless under satisfactory censorship or otherwise exempt, the following rules are established with
regard to the treatment of submarine telegraphic cables
in time of war, irrespective of their ownership."
Clauses (a) and (c) are generally accepted as correct
statements of the rules to be followed in case of cables
connecting belligerent points on the one hand and neutral points on the other.
The situation involved in clause (b), "Submarine
that the provisions of Article

5

:

telegraphic cables between the territory of an enemy
and neutral territory may be interrupted within the

enemy," in various forms
has been much discussed. It has been claimed that a
submarine telegraphic cable between the terrritory of
an enemy and neutral territory (1) should not be interrupted under any conditions, (2) could be interrupted
only within the three-mile limit, (3) could be interrupted
only when the belligerent landing place was under effective blockade, and (4) could be interrupted at any point
territorial jurisdiction of the

neutral jurisdiction if military necessity
required such interruption. Others would modify some
of these provisions further according to ownership, locaoutside of

tion, etc.

The subject of the treatment of submarine telegraphic
cables was quite fully considered in the report of the
Interdepartmental Committee on Cable Communications, made to the English Parliament, March 26, 1902.
The Institute of International Law also gave the subject
much attention at its meeting in September, 1902. The
English committee admits that arrangements should be
made on the supposition that a considerable propor'

'
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and that "it will be the

tion of cables will be cut,"

interest of the belligerents to interrupt or control,

by

censorship, the telegraphic cornmunications of their
adversaries, even to the degree of occasioning detriment
to neutrals

and

of incurring liability to

make compen-

sation to

them

cables."

(Certain phases of the subject of the treatment

for arbitrary interference with their

submarine telegraphic cables in time of war were
discussed in the International Law Situations, Naval
of

War
At

College, 1902, pp. 7-20.)

the session of the Institute of International

in 1902 the question of the treatment of

submarine

Law
tele-

graphic cables in time of war received much attention.
Bearing upon the case of cables connecting neutral and
belligerent territory, Von Bar, one of the German representatives, advanced the following proposition:

Comme

de communiquer librenient
avec les belligerants, les seuls titres admissibles pour entraver ou
couper cette communication libre etant le blocns effectif et l'occupation militaire, il y a lieu de tirer les conclusions suivantes:
les

pays neutres ont

le droit

(a) Le cable sous-marin reliant un territoire neutre aun territoire
appartenant a une des parties en guerre ne peut etre coupe par un
des belligerants que dans les cas suivants:

En pleinemer ou dans

la

mer

ennemi, s'il y
rayon ou se trouw

territoriale de l'Etat

a blocus effectif et que ce blocus embrasse

le

le cable;

Dans
ou

l'ile

soit

le territoire

ou passe

le

ennemi meme,

si

l'endroit de la cote

cable est occupe, soit pour

momentanement, par

ou aboutit

un temps

prolon.uv.

la partie belligerante.

En dehors de ces cas, le cable en question est inviolable en
mer comme dans la mer territoriale de la partie ennemie.
Le

pleine

du cable en question
y a droit de le couper.
(c) II n'y a pas de difference a etablir, quant au droit d'un Etat
belligerant de couper un cable sous-marin ou del'exploiter, entre les
cables exploites par un gouvernement neutre et les cables exploites
par des compagnies privees concessionnaires.
(6)

n'existe

droit de s'emparer et de profiter

que dans

les cas

ou

il

Dans les*cas precites ou existe le droit de l'Etat belligerant de
couper un cable sous-marin ou de s'en emparer autremcnt, aucun
dedommagement du chef de l'exercice de ce droit n'est du a la compagnie ni a l'Etat a qui appartient le cable, ni aux personnea qui
auraient fait cabler des depeches. (Annuaire de L'lnstitnt de Dr< >ir
(cl)

International, 19, 1902, p. 12.)

:
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Von Bar
II

me

further says

semble pourtant, sans

la theorie

du

(p. 16)
qu'il soit necessaire de faire

que Ton peut poser simplement
neutres, et de

usage de

droit d'angarie, droit douteux et souvent conteste,

meme

comme

leurs sujets, ont

le

regie generale que les Etats

droit de

communiquer

libre-

ment aveo l'une et l'autre des parties belligerantes et leurs territoires, et qu'on ne doit reconnaitre a cette regie que deux exceptions,
dont l'une se fonde sur I 'occupation militaire et l'autre sur le droit
de blocus.

Comme la pleine mer ne

ne peut etre permis
un pays neutre
et un territoire ennemi, et comme le blocus, pour donner le droit
d'interrompre les communications des neutres avec l'ennemi, doit
etre effect if il n'y a pas lieu d'etendre 1' exception de maniere a
permettre la destruction d'un cable en pleine mer a la seule condition que cela se fasse a une distance du territoire ennemi ou un
blocus peut etre exerce, mais n'est pas pratique reellement.
La question speciale la plus delicate est peut-etre celle de savoir
si TEtat belligerant a le droit de couper des cables reliant un territoire neutre a un territoire ennemi dans les eaux territoriales de
l'ennemi. II semble juste de faire dependre la solution de la possiDans les eaux territoriales, soumises
bilite d'une occupation reelle.
completement a la souverainete de l'Etat et, de ce chef, pouvant
etre occupees reellement, ce droit existe. Mais il n'existe pas quant
a la mer territoriale dans le sens des resolutions de Tlnstitut de 1894
(Annuaire, 13, p. 329) (" Kiistenmeer "), cette partie de la mer
n'etant pas completement soumise a la souverainete exclusive de
l'Etat riverain, et servant, au contraire, au commerce general et
de couper

un

peut etre occupee,

il

cable servant de communication entre

,

libre

du monde

entier.

Renault, one of the French members, disagreed with
Yon Bar, saying, that while agreeing with (&), (c), (f?),
above, he did not agree with (a).
un territoire neutre au
pour l'autre belligerant
le droit de couper le cable, soit sur le territoire ou dans les eaux
territoriales de son adversaire, soit meme en pleine mer.
Je ne distingue pas suivant qu'il y a ou non blocus. (Annuaire
Dans

le

cas d'un cable sous-marin reliant

territoire de l'un des belligerants, j'admets

1902, p. 18.)

Other propositions were advanced.
land, of Oxford, offered the following
1.

(p.

301)

Le cable telegraphique sous-marin, unissant deux

neutres, est inviolable.
2.

Professor Hol-

territoires

(Institut de Droit international, 1879.)

Le cable reliant les territoires de deux belligerants ou deux
du territoire d'un des belligerants peut etre coupe partout,

parties

excepte dans les eaux territoriales neutres.

:

.
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Le cable

3.

a

un

reliant

un

territoire neutre a

un territoire appartenant

des belligerants ne peut etre coupe que dans les eaux terri-

toriales de ce belligerant.
4. En ce qui concerne 1' application des regies precedentes, il n'y
a de difference a etablir, ni entre les cables d'Etat et les cables
appartenant a des individus, ni entre les cables de propriete ennemie

ceux qui sont de propriete neutre.
Quand la coupure d'un cable est permise selon les regies piv<Vdentes, aucune indemnity n'est due aux proprietaires ennemis du
(Les
cable pour cet acte, accompli comme operation de guerre.
53
la
La
Haye
ne
sont
prescriptions de l'article
de
Convention de
et

5.

pas applicables a ce cas.)
6. Au contraire, le belligerant qui a coupe un cable de propriete
neutre (soit d'Etat, soit d'individus), dans l'exercice d'un droit
analogue au jus angariae [ou de visite en haute mer (1)], est tenu
des frais de reparation. II n'est pas tenu d'indemniser les proprie(Annuaire 1902, p. 301.)
taires pour la perte de leurs benefices.

Professor Perels,
(p.
1

of

Berlin,

offered the

following

302)

Le cable telegraphique sous-niarin reliant des territoires neutres

est inviolable.
2. La liberte d'action des belligerants n'est pas restreinte, si le
cable relie leurs territoires respectifs ou deux points du territoire

d'un seul des belligerants.
3. Pour le cas ou le cable relierait le territoire d'un belligerant et
le territoire d'un neutre, une reglementation generale n'est pas
possible actuellement. Les mesures a prendre dependront, selon
les circonstances, des operations rnilitaires; elles ne dependent nullement du droit de propriete des cables.
Dans l'interet du commerce international, il estcependant desirable de ne detruire ou interrompre la communication telegraphique
que si la necessity militaire l'exige.

Rolin, editor of the
legislation
(p.

Revue de

droit international et de

comparee made the following proposition

317):

Le cable sous-marin
appartenant a une des
etre coupe par un des

reliant

un

territoire neutre a

un

parties en guerre ne pourra en

territoire

aucun cas

belligerants dans les eaux territorial is on

neutralisees dependant d'un territoire neutre.

H pourra etre coupe, selon les necessites des operations militaitf
sur le territoire et dans les eaux territoriales de l'ennenii.
H pourra egalement etre coupe en pleine mer, si apres avoir
notifie a l'Etat neutre l'interdiction de transmettre des depeches,
* * *
etc.

Upon

a vote of the Institute of International Law in
1902, as to whether it should be absolutely forbidden to

:
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interrupt in the high sea a cable uniting a belligerent
and a neutral, 14 favored absolute prohibition of interruption of such cable in the high sea, 17 opposed such
prohibition, and 1 did not vote.
subsequent vote

A

showed that although the

institute

was not

in favor of

absolute prohibition of interruption of cables in the
high sea, it was not, therefore, of the opinion that the
right to interrupt was unlimited.
Finally the institute, 19 voting in the affirmative,
6

in the negative,

ing

(p.

and

4 not voting, adopted the follow-

331)

REGLES CONCERN ANT LES CABLES SOUS-MARINS EN TEMPS DE GUERRE.
I.

Le cable sous-marin

reliant

deux

territoires neutres est in-

violable.

Le cable reliant les territoires de denx belligerants ou deux
parties du territoire d'un des belligerants peut etre coupe partout,
excepte dans la mer territoriale et dans les eaux neutralisees
II.

dependant d'un

territoire neutre ("neutralisees "

declaration conformement a

1' article

par traite ou par

4 des resolutions de Paris de

1894).
III.

Le cable

reliant

belligerants ne peut en

un

territoire neutre

aucun cas

au

territoire

etre coupe dans la

d'un des

mer territoriale

ou dans les. eaux neutralisees dependant d'un territoire neutre.
En haute mer, ce cable ne peut etre coupe que s'il y a blocus
effectif et dans les limites de la ligne du blocus, sauf retablissenient
du cable dans le plus bref delai possible. Ce cable peut tou jours
etre coupe sur le territoire et dans la mer territoriale dependant
d'un territoire ennemi jusqu'a une distance de trois milles marins
de la laisse de basse-maree.
IV. II est entendu que la liberte de l'Etat neutre de transmettre
des depeches n'implique pas la faculte d'en user ou d'en permettre
l'usage manifestement pour preter assistance a l'un des belligerants.
V. En ce qui concerne l'application des regies precedentes, il n'y
a de difference a etablir ni entre les cables d'Etat et les cables appartenant a des particuliers, ni entre les cables de propriete ennemie et
ceux qui sont de propriete neutre.

The above

rules are in

some respects more exact than

those of the Naval War Code, though, as the discussions show, not wholly satisfactory to members of the
Institute.

The

same as that of the
Naval War Code.
The second rule contains a provision protecting a
cable which connects belligerent in so far as it is
first

rule

is

essentially the
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This is covered
Code, however.

actually within neutral jurisdiction.

by Article 2 of the Naval War
The third rule is more detailed and specific than the
provisions of the Naval War Code, which is that "Submarine telegraphic cables between the territory of an
enemy and neutral territory may be interrupted within
the territorial jurisdiction of the enemy." The rules
of the institute cover this point in the last clause of this

In regard to this provision of the Naval
War Code, the statement is that such cables may be cut
within enemy jurisdiction, and not that they are not
It is certain that such a cable
to be cut elsewhere.
should not be interrupted by any act which itself shall
take place within neutral jurisdiction. It would not,
of course, be allowable for any belligerent to cut any
cable within the three-mile limit of a neutral state.
There is then left entirely undetermined the status of
cables between an enemy and a neutral so far as they
lie in the high seas.
third rule.

between neutrals and belligerents can be cut
only within the jurisdiction of the belligerent, it would
be good policy for a belligerent to see that, so far as
possible, immediately on the outbreak of hostilities a
neutral landing place be interposed between the termini
If cables

of all his cables or to

make provision

for neutral landing

places in their original construction, thus leaving only
the guardianship of the cable line within the three-mile

This would probably
not be maintained seriously in a case necessitating the
cutting of a cable, even beyond the three-mile limit, or,
as was maintained in the Spanish-American war, "the
limit of the range of the enemy's gun."
(Wilson, Submarine Telegraphic Cables in their International Rela-

limit for the belligerent's cruisers.

tions.

Lectures, Naval

War

College, Newport,

L901,

p. 32.)

Further, it may be said: "This code does not, however,
cover the debatable points in regard to cables which arc
beyond the three-mile limit or other limits of jurisdictioD
of a belligerent and the same limits of a neutral stair.
The status of such cables must be determined, \'<>v the
20681

3
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present,

by reference

to

general

principles

and the

tendency is to so determine their status. This is necessary because great injury might be done to one or both
of the belligerents if the laws of different states might
say what was proper service in the time of war, as was
formerly thought to be possible unless a convention was
adopted among the leading states. If the material of
which the cable is to be made is liable to seizure and
confiscation on the high sea in the time of war, then it
is not too much to claim that the cable itself, when in
full operation, is liable to the consequences of war under
like circumstances."

The

(Ibid, p. 37.)

rule of the Institute tries to cover the treatment

beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the belligerent by specifying that only within the limits of
effective blockade is cutting allowable.
The fourth rule
introduces an idea, which, if carried out, would make all
of cables

cutting unnecessary, for it is only to prevent the transmission of hostile messages that cutting is necessary
within the territorial jurisdiction of the enemy, within
blockade lines, or at any other point. The destruction
of a harmless cable would be prohibited as wanton
devastation.
It will be evident that if the fourth rule
can be enforced the third will be unnecessary, because
a cable of this class would not be used for hostile purIf the fourth rule is not enforced, the limitation
poses.
of cutting to the places specified in the third rule

becomes arbitrary.

The fourth of these rules in regard to cables adopted
by the Institute states that "It is intended that the
liberty of the neutral state to transmit dispatches shall

not involve the right to use or to permit their use, maniThis
festly for lending aid to one of the belligerents."
for
the prerule does not, however, provide any means
vention of the use which is forbidden.
If a submarine cable connecting one belligerent and a
neutral state is used to aid that belligerent, the other
belligerent doubtless has a right to prevent such use in
any reasonable manner provided he does not thereby
This fourth
violate neutral territory or neutral rights.

:
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rule provides that the neutral has no right to permit the

cable to be used manifestly to aid one of the belligerents.
If the neutral does not prevent such use, then the other

impliedly must

take action. The action
most
is often the cutting of the
cable outside of neutral jurisdiction.
Therefore, if military necessity justifies such action, it may be taken.
The officer responsible for the interruption must realize
that he assumes the responsibility and that this responsibility should be assumed only when based on military
As M. Renault well said in the discussion,
necessity.
"II faut qu'a des moyens d'attaque nouveaux correspondent des moyens de defense nouveaux: le moyen d'attaque etant devenu plus rapide et plus dangereux, le
moyen de defense peut devenir plus dur, puisque autrement il n'y aurait plus aucun moyen de defense du tout.'
(Annuaire, 1902, p. 314.)
Pending an international agreement, the followingwording would meet the requirements of the United
States Navy, while giving reasonable guarantee as to
the observance of neutral rights
belligerent

feasible

and certain

,

Unless under satisfactory censorship or otherwise exempt,
the following rules are established with regard to the treatment of
submarine telegraphic cables in time of war, irrespective of their
ownership:

Art.

5.

Submarine telegraphic cables between points in the territory
enemy, or between the territory of the United States and
that of an enemy, are subject to such treatment as the necessities of
(a)

of an

war may

require.

Submarine telegraphic cables between the territory of an
enemy and neutral territory may be interrupted within the territorial jurisdiction of the enemy or at any point outside of neutral
(b)

jurisdiction, if the necessities of
(c)

war

require.

Submarine telegraphic cables between two neutral
and free from interruption.

territories

shall be held inviolable

There is no doubt, however, that this whole mailer of
the treatment of submarine telegraphic cables in time
of war should be referred to an international convention
for adjustment.
So far as the present conditions are
concerned the rules as above stated accord with practice,
and while opinion is divided, some of the besl authorities agree with the above rules and particularly with the
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provision that military necessity may compel interruption ontside of neutral jurisdiction.
[Perels, Das international offentliche Seerecht der Gegenwart, Berlin,
1903 p. 186.] The rules should, from the above and from
other reasons, read as stated until some international
;

agreement
(b)

is

devised.

Should a provision in regard to wireless telegraphy

be inserted in the code ?

At

the present time, the future of wireless telegraphy
is uncertain and the possibility of interruption not fully
determined. There is no reason for binding the officers
by any regulations in advance of more accurate knowledge of the subject itself and of its possibilities. Therefore the proposition to insert a provision in regard to
wireless telegraphy should not be entertained unless by
international agreement.
Article
If military necessity

6.

should require

it,

neutral vessels

found within the limits of belligerent authority may be
seized and destroyed or otherwise utilized for military
purposes, but in such cases the owners of neutral vessels must be fully recompensed.
The amount of the
indemnity should, if practicable, be agreed on in advance
with the owner or master of the vessel. Due regard
must be had to treaty stipulations upon these matters.
Could a

fast pleasure

yacht be seized and used for a

dispatch boat under the provisions of Article 6 ?
" Military necessity, as understood by modern

civil-

ized nations, consists in the necessity of those measures

which are indispensable for securing the ends of war
and which are lawful according to the modern law and
usages of war." (Instructions for the Government of
Armies of the United States, Article 14; Naval War
Code, Article

3.)

yacht
could be seized and used for a dispatch boat without
question.
A fast pleasure yacht is properly included
under the clause "neutral vessels."
If military necessity exists, the fast pleasure

:
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Article

7.

of false colors in war is forbidden, and when
a vessel to lie to, or before firing a gun in
action, the national colors should be displayed by vessels of the United States.

The use

summoning

Does "war," as used in Article 7, mean the period
of actual engagement in hostile action or the period from
(a)

the declaration to the termination of the
eral sense

war in the gen-

?

As war throughout

the code is used to indicate the
period during which the peaceful relations between
states are severed, there is no reason for giving to the word
Therefore, the
a different interpretation at this point.

word does not refer

engagement, but to the period
of hostile relationship between the states, regardless of
to the

the issue or failure to issue a declaration.
" No one can claim, as a right, that a public declaration of war shall be promulgated, unless it be the nation

made, and then it serves only
as a notice to their own citizens and subjects."
(Blatch-

by whose government

it is

"Hiawatha," 1.)
"The question of the point of time at which a stale
of peace gives way to a condition of war is a question
ford, Prize Cases; Betts, J., in

of fact.

War begins with the first act of open hostili! y."

"Science of International Law," p. 243.)
Risley, in "The Law of War," page 82, summarizes the
(Walker,

present position
The following conclusions seem to be warranted:
1. War, as affecting belligerents inter se, commences from the
date of an absolute declaration if its issue precede any act of hosIn all other cases the war dates from the commencement of
tility.
Thus if a conditional declaration, such as an ultimatum
hostilities.
addressed to an offending state, is followed by war, the war will
date from the commencement of hostilities and not from the conditional declaration.

War, as affecting any neutral power, commences from the date
which the neutral power has, or may reasonably be supposed to
have, knowledge of its existence. If a declaration or manifesto is
issued, the neutral's knowledge of course dates from the official
announcement in all other cases the conduct of neutrals is entitled
to the most favorable construction, and hostilities must have become
so open and notorious that ignorance of them on the part of the
.2.

at

;

'
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neutral is impossible before the liabilities attaching to their neutral
character will be enforced by the belligerents.
In modern times, however, questions as to the commencement of
war are not likely to arise, because the rapidity of communication,
the activity of the press, and the publicity accorded to all matters of
domestic and international policy combine to make the outbreak
of a

war immediately known

all

Every state is in
commencement, whether it
or the date of the commence-

over the world.

fact cognizant of the precise date of its

be the date of an

ment

official notification

of actual hostilities.

Should the entire article be stricken out ?
Admitting that war " applies to the entire period of
hostile relationships, and no other interpretation can be
(b)

'

'

what does the Article 7 mean ?
The use of a false flag is forbidden during the

given,
1.

period of war.

Before or when firing a gun or engaging in action,
the flag of the United States should be displayed.
2.

There is no obligation to display the flag of the
United States till the time of summoning a vessel to
lie to or till the time of action.
The absence of any
3.

flag, or

the presence of a flag which

is

not

false, is

not

mentioned.

Upon

2

and

3 all

authorities

who

refer to the subject

are agreed, i. e., that before firing a gun the true flag
must be displayed and that till such time no flag need

be raised.

There remains the question whether what many regard
as a form of perfidy is allowable up to the time of firing
a gun and is not allowable at the actual discharge of
the gun, when it would be of little or no service other
than to establish to a certainty the probable enemy
character of the vessel firing the gun. It would not be
presumed that a neutral would fire upon a belligerent
or one vessel of a belligerent upon another vessel of the
same belligerent, consequently it is held that the false
flag would be pulled down and the true flag would be
displayed at the time when the false flag would be of no
further use.

In summoning a neutral vessel to
true colors is necessary, however, as

the use of
establishes the

lie to
it

:

:

:
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and gives evidence of its right in
time of war to interfere with neutral commerce.
The nse of false colors in land warfare has been abso-

identity of the vessel

lutely prohibited, as

shown

in the following.

Instructions United States
The use

Army,

18G3, Article 65

of the enemy's national standard, flag, or other

nationality, for the purpose of deceiving the

act of perfidy

by which they

enemy

emblem

in battle,

is

of

an

lose all claim to the protection of the

laws of war.

Brussels Rules, 1874, Articles
Art.

power

12.

The laws

of

12, 13:

war do not allow to belligerents an unlimited
means of injuring the enemy.

as to the choice of

Art.

13.

According to

(/) Abuse

this principle are strictly forbidden:

of the flag of truce, the national flag, or the military

insignia or uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive badges
of the

Geneva Convention.

Oxford Manual,

1880, section 8

It is forbidden:

(d)

To make improper use of

the national flag, of signs of military

ranks, or of the uniform of the enemy, of a flag of truce, or of the
protective marks prescribed by the Convention of Geneva.

Hague Convention, Laws and Customs
Land, Article XXIII

of

War

Besides the prohibitions provided by special conventions,
especially prohibited:

on

it is

(/) To make improper use of a flag of truce, the national flag, or
military ensigns and the enemy's uniform, as well as the distinctive
badges of the Geneva Convention.

has come to be the generally accepted opinion that
"deceit involving perfidy should be forbidden."
The flag is the emblem held most esteemed and sacred
among states. It is the usual method of showing allegiance and is to be raised only on sufficient authority.
The use of false colors on land or similar perfidy declaim to protection of the laws
prives the users of the
of war."
It is evident that the use of false colors in warfare on
the sea may bring about results very different from hose
which would follow warfare in which false colors were
prohibited.
Pillet has proposed the establishment of a
It

'

'

t

:
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zone into which no vessel may come without establishing its identity. He says
Les transformations de rarmement maritime ont rendu cette regie
au point de vue de la securite
qu'un navire de guerre
son veritable pavilion qu'au moment precis ou il

traditionnelle tout a fait insuffisante

des belligerants.

ennemi ne hisse

II est

possible, en effet,

lache la bordee qui mettra son adversaire hors de combat; il est possible surtout, qu'un torpilleur s'approche a bonne portee, puis arbore
ses couleurs et immediatement lance une torpille contre laquelle le
navire vise ne pourra pas tou jours se proteger. La tolerance admise
quant au pavilion peut ainsi avoir pour consequence des surprises
fatales, surprises que cette seule tolerance permet de pratiquer.
Ce
n'est evidemment pas pour obtenir de tels resultats que la liberte
ancienne a ete admise, et on ne prevoyait pas, au moment ou cette
coutume s'est formee, que la rapidite de certains navires et la puissance de leurs engins de destruction permettraient ainsi de miner
un vaisseau de guerre avant meme qu'il put savoir qu'il etait en
presence d'un ennemi. Pour remedier a cet inconvenient qui est
grave il conviendrait de s'attacher a une idee emise autrefois par
quelques auteurs (De Cussy, Causes celebres du droit des gens, 1 liv.,
Ill, sec. 60; Hautefeuille, Histoire des origines, p. 23; Bluntschli,
Volkerrecht, sec. 318; Phillimore, Commentaries upon international
law, t. 1, sec. 203) et de conferer aux navires de guerre des belligerants le droit de juridiction sur une certaine zone (de trois milles

de rayon par exemple) dont chaque navire serait le centre, et dans
laquelle aucun vaisseau de guerre ne pourrait entrer sans se faire
reconnaitre, a peine d'etre traite comme ennemi. II est a souhaiter
que les Puissances maritimes s'occupent de cette difficulte, et qi 'une
convention internationale soit signee qui consacre la solution que
nous proposons. (Les Lois Actuelles de la Guerre, 2d ed., p. 144.)

Hall makes the following statement of snch rules as
allow false colors

A curious arbitrary rule affects one class of strategems by forbidding certain permitted means of deception from the moment at
which they cease to deceive. It is perfectly legitimate to use the
distinctive emblems of an enemy in order to escape from him or to
draw his forces into action; but it is held that soldiers clothed in the
uniforms of their enemy must put on a conspicuous mark by which
they can be recognized before attacking, and that a vessel using the
enemy's flag must hoist its own flag before firing with shot or shell.
The rule, disobedience to which is considered to entail grave dishonor, has been based on the statement that "in actual battle,
enemies are bound to combat loyally and are not free to insure victory by putting on a mask of friendship.'' In war upon land victory
might be so insured, and the rule is consequently sensible; but at
sea, and the prohibition is spoken of generally with reference to
maritime war, the mask of friendship no longer misleads when

;
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once fighting begins, and it is not easy to see why it is more diswear a disguise when it is obviously useless, than when it
(Hall, International Law, 4th ed., p. 558.)
serves its purpose.

loyal to

of " false colors "

evidently subject to much
difference of opinion.
(See Perels, Seerecht ger Gegenwart, p. 182.) JSTo scheme of such use has been pro-

The use

is

posed which seems satisfactory, and it is difficult to see
how honorable warfare can be conducted upon such a
Undoubtbasis as is implied in the use of false colors.
edly, the rule prohibiting the use of false colors in war
should be made with definite provisions in regard to
legitimate ruses in maritime warfare.
It is, however, the opinion of the officers in conference
upon this subject that the United States, without a similar provision against the use of false colors by other

would be put at great disadvantage in time of
war through the existence of this prohibition in the
United States Naval War Code. The officers were then
fore almost unanimously (one dissenting) of the opinion
that this rule should be stricken from the code pending
some international agreement upon the use of "false

States,

-

colors."

Should all of the article following the word forbidden " be stricken out ?
forIf the article is retained, the words following
"
bidden in Article 7 are necessary as specifying at what
time the national colors should be displayed, while during the period preceding there is no prohibition of the
'

(c)

'

'

'

use of emblems that are not in the category of false
colors, nor objection to sailing without a flag.
(d) Could a torpedo boat approach near an enemy
ship under false colors and then raising true colors
launch a torpedo against its opponent ?
Under the present rules there would be no difference
in the application of the rule to a torpedo or other
vessel.
(e)

One author

says,

"A ship may by employing false

colors attempt to escape pursuit on the part of the

enemy

or perhaps even force a blockade; but it is absolutely forbidden by the regulations as well as by the

usages of war to engage in hostilities under a false flag
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violation of this rule

would be inexcusable even

case of the most pressing necessity."
position correct and in what respects

This situation

(1)

(3)

to

engage in

The use

is it

far

is this

incorrect?

falls into three divisions, (1)

false colors to escape pursuit, (2)

and

How

in the

the use of
to force a blockade,

hostilities.

of false colors to evade pursuit has gen-

erally been held as allowable.

must be remembered,
an enemy vessel under
It

however, that this escape of
false colors may add just so much to the fighting force
of the enemy by so much delaying the realization of the
end of war, viz, "the complete submission of the enemy
at the earliest possible

moment."

The forcing

of a blockade under false colors is
(2)
generally regarded as an act of war and therefore for-

bidden. This seems to be the more reasonable opinion
and the opinion which the fact sustains. The passing
of a blockade by a public ship of a neutral is a courtesy
allowed on the part of the blockading fleet.
neutral
should not be put under suspicion because it is allowable
for an enemy to use his flag.
The consequences of this
form of deceit so directly affect the neutral that such
use of the flag should be forbidden.
(3) The remaining portion of the quotation is in
accord with the best opinion and would be universally
upheld.
It is the final opinion that Article 7 should be made
the subject of international agreement or else should be

A

repealed.
Article

8.

In the event of an enemy failing to observe the laws
and usages of war, if the offender is beyond reach, resort
may be had to reprisals, if such action should be considered a necessity but due regard must always be had
Reprisals should not exceed
to the duties of humanity.
in severity the offense committed, and must not be resorted to when the injury complained of has been
;

repaired.
If the offender is within the power of the United
States he can be punished, after due trial, by a properly
constituted military or naval tribunal. Such offenders
are liable to the punishments specified by the criminal
law.

:
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In fourth line of Article 8, should the word "milibe inserted before the word "necessity?"
No, because in general cases where reprisals would be
resorted to, such actions would not be because of military necessity, but rather for disciplinary purposes in
order that the laws and usages of war might subsequently be observed, e. g., when uncivilized peoples do
not observe these rules.
Action in the nature of reprisal against civilized
enemies should be sanctioned by the general government
and not undertaken by a subordinate officer unless a
military necessity requires, as there are other means for
the treatment of civilized enemies.
prominent authority says, Reprisal is an act
(b)
of vengeance pure and simple and should be wholly
proscribed or at least reserved for wars undertaken
against the uncivilized who have no notion of the law
of nations and are accessible only to the feeling of
fear." Is this a proper statement of the fact and should
the whole of Article 8 be stricken out?
This is not a correct statement of fact as reprisals are
now viewed, though reprisals may sometimes be acts of
vengeance. This is the general continental point of
view, however. The English and American point of view
is that reprisals are undertaken to secure redress for injuries and usually are aimed against property or intercourse, rarely against persons.
Article 8 is however greatly restricted as Been in its
provisions for reprisals
"laws and usages of war," one
1. For violation of
(a)

tary "

A

'

'

specific cause.

By an

3.

"offender beyond reach."
In case of "necessity" only.

4.

Within duties

2.

of

"humanity."

Proportioned to offense.
6. Only in case of "injury not repaired."
7. Outside power of the United States.
Upon this debatable question of reprisals, an almost
wholly obsolete form of action, probably it would have
been better to refrain from utterance, but in view of the
fact that the article has been issued, it may be well to
leave it unchanged.
5.

